@metamask/message-manager
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:jsonschema | AI (phantom-deps): Listed as runtime dep in package.json; phantom-dep heuristic misfires for this monorepo package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/uuid | AI (phantom-deps): Type-only package loaded by convention; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@metamask/eth-sig-util | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep; phantom-dep heuristic misfires for MetaMask monorepo packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 14.1.2 | 8 / 9 | |
| 14.1.1 | 8 / 9 | |
| 14.1.0 | 8 / 9 | |
| 14.0.0 | 8 / 8 |
v14.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v14.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v14.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v14.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.