@metamask/mobile-wallet-protocol-wallet-client
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Monorepo sub-package pattern; missing description is cosmetic, not a risk signal for this publisher. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): MetaMask packages in this monorepo consistently lack provenance; not a risk indicator here. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.2.2 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.2.1 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.2.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.1.1 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.1.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.0.6 | 3 / 6 |
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.