@metaplex-foundation/umi
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:uuid | AI (typosquat): False positive: @metaplex-foundation/umi is a scoped package under the official Metaplex Foundation npm org, not a typosquat of uuid. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): False positive: @metaplex-foundation/umi is a scoped package under the official Metaplex Foundation npm org, not a typosquat of joi. | ai |
v1.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.