@metaplex-foundation/umi-public-keys
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@metaplex-foundation/umi-serializers-encodings | AI (dependencies): Sibling package within the Metaplex UMI monorepo; expected dependency for this package family. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Metaplex Foundation packages historically lack Sigstore provenance; not a security concern for this established org. | ai |
v1.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.