@microsoft/sp-module-interfaces
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Loads local JSON schema files from __dirname; not arbitrary module loading. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:toplevel-fetch | AI (semgrep): Fetches a Microsoft-owned JSON schema URL for validation; not telemetry or exfiltration. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.23.1 | 2 / 5 | |
| 1.23.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 1.22.2 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.22.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.22.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.21.1 | 2 / 3 |
v1.23.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.23.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.22.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.22.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.21.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.