@microsoft/teams.api
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from individual Microsoft employee (aamirjawaid) to Microsoft 1ES org account (microsoft1es) is a legitimate infrastructure transition, consistent across the @microsoft/teams.* namespace. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): microsoft-oss-releases is Microsoft's OSS publishing infrastructure account; addition is expected for packages moving to centralized 1ES publishing. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Missing gitHead is consistent with the CI/CD pipeline change to Microsoft 1ES publishing infrastructure; not a malicious signal for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Microsoft publisher; lack of Sigstore provenance is common and not a meaningful risk signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.12 | 4 / 10 | |
| 2.0.11 | 4 / 10 | |
| 2.0.10 | 4 / 10 | |
| 2.0.9 | 4 / 10 | |
| 2.0.8 | 4 / 10 | |
| 2.0.7 | 4 / 10 | |
| 2.0.6 | 4 / 10 | |
| 2.0.5 | 2 / 10 | |
| 2.0.4 | 2 / 10 | |
| 2.0.3 | 2 / 10 | |
| 2.0.2 | 2 / 10 | |
| 2.0.1 | 2 / 10 | |
| 2.0.0 | 2 / 10 |
v2.0.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.10
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: microsoft1es.
v2.0.9
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: microsoft1es.
v2.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.