@miden-sdk/vite-plugin
Vite plugin for Miden dApps — WASM dedup, COOP/COEP headers, and gRPC-web proxy
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; legitimate pipeline change for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Missing gitHead is expected when switching to SLSA-attested CI publishing; provenance attestation supersedes it. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.14.10 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.14.9 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.14.8 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.14.5 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.14.4 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.14.3 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.14.2 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.13.4 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.13.3 | 0 / 4 |
v0.14.10
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v0.14.9
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.8
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.13.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.