@midnight-ntwrk/compact-runtime
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Consistent across all versions of this org's packages; not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/object-inspect | AI (phantom-deps): @types/object-inspect is a type-only package; not directly imported at runtime is expected behavior. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.16.0 | 3 / 11 | |
| 0.15.0 | 3 / 11 | |
| 0.14.0 | 3 / 11 | |
| 0.9.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.8.1 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.7.1 | 3 / 6 |
v0.16.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.14.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.9.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.