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@midscene/computer-linux

Midscene.js Computer Desktop Automation for Linux

51
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

quanruzhoushawyuyutaotaojingkai.zhao

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher to GitHub Actions CI/CD is confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation; stable for this package. ai
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): The @midscene ecosystem does not publish with Sigstore provenance; this is consistent across all versions and not a security concern for this package. ai

Versions (showing 51 of 60)

View all versions
Version Deps Published
1.9.1 1 / 3
1.9.0 1 / 3
1.8.11 1 / 3
1.8.10 1 / 3
1.8.9 1 / 3
1.8.8 1 / 3
1.8.7 1 / 3
1.8.6 1 / 3
1.8.5 1 / 3
1.8.4 1 / 3
1.8.3 1 / 3
1.8.2 1 / 3
1.8.1 1 / 3
1.8.0 1 / 3
1.7.10 1 / 3
1.7.9 1 / 3
1.7.7 1 / 3
1.7.6 1 / 3
1.7.5 1 / 3
1.7.4 1 / 3
1.7.3 1 / 3
1.7.2 1 / 3
1.7.1 1 / 3
1.7.0 1 / 3
1.6.4 1 / 3
1.6.3 1 / 3
1.6.2 1 / 3
1.6.1 1 / 3
1.6.0 1 / 3
1.5.8 1 / 3
1.5.7 1 / 3
1.5.6 1 / 3
1.5.5 1 / 3
1.5.4 1 / 3
1.5.3 1 / 3
1.5.2 1 / 3
1.5.1 1 / 3
1.5.0 1 / 3
1.4.9 1 / 3
1.4.8 1 / 3
1.4.7 1 / 3
1.4.6 1 / 3
1.4.5 1 / 3
1.4.4 1 / 3
1.4.3 1 / 3
1.4.2 1 / 3
1.4.1 1 / 3
1.4.0 1 / 3
1.3.11 1 / 3
1.3.10 1 / 3
1.3.9 1 / 3

v1.9.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.9.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.8.11

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.8.10

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.8.9

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.8.8

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.8.7

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.8.6

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.8.5

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.8.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: quanru → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-21) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.8.3

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.8.2

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.8.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.8.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.7.10

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.7.9

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.7.7

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.7.5

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.7.4

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.7.3

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.7.2

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.7.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.7.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.6.4

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.6.3

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.6.2

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.6.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.6.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.5.8

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-03-25) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.5.7

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-03-23) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.5.6

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-03-17) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.5.5

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-03-16) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.5.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-03-11) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.5.3

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-03-09) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.5.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-03-04) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.5.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-03-03) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.5.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-03-02) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.9

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-28) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.8

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-28) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.7

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-25) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.6

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-24) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.5

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-14) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-14) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.3

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.3.11

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-11) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.3.10

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-09) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.3.9

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-06) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.