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@midscene/computer-win

Midscene.js Computer Desktop Automation for Windows

51
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

quanruzhoushawyuyutaotaojingkai.zhao

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): quanru is an established contributor (17 approved packages) within the same web-infra-dev/midscene org; publisher change reflects a legitimate internal team transition. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-added AI (maintainer-change): quanru has a clean track record (17 approved, 0 rejected) and is part of the same midscene monorepo org; addition is consistent with legitimate team expansion. ai
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): Midscene.js is a legitimate open-source project under web-infra-dev; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal for this package. ai

Versions (showing 51 of 59)

View all versions
Version Deps Published
1.9.1 1 / 3
1.9.0 1 / 3
1.8.11 1 / 3
1.8.10 1 / 3
1.8.9 1 / 3
1.8.8 1 / 3
1.8.7 1 / 3
1.8.6 1 / 3
1.8.5 1 / 3
1.8.4 1 / 3
1.8.2 1 / 3
1.8.1 1 / 3
1.8.0 1 / 3
1.7.10 1 / 3
1.7.9 1 / 3
1.7.7 1 / 3
1.7.6 1 / 3
1.7.5 1 / 3
1.7.4 1 / 3
1.7.3 1 / 3
1.7.2 1 / 3
1.7.1 1 / 3
1.7.0 1 / 3
1.6.4 1 / 3
1.6.3 1 / 3
1.6.2 1 / 3
1.6.1 1 / 3
1.6.0 1 / 3
1.5.8 1 / 3
1.5.7 1 / 3
1.5.6 1 / 3
1.5.5 1 / 3
1.5.4 1 / 3
1.5.3 1 / 3
1.5.2 1 / 3
1.5.1 1 / 3
1.5.0 1 / 3
1.4.9 1 / 3
1.4.8 1 / 3
1.4.7 1 / 3
1.4.6 1 / 3
1.4.5 1 / 3
1.4.4 1 / 3
1.4.3 1 / 3
1.4.2 1 / 3
1.4.1 1 / 3
1.4.0 1 / 3
1.3.11 1 / 3
1.3.10 1 / 3
1.3.9 1 / 3
1.3.8 1 / 3

v1.9.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.9.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.8.11

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.8.10

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.8.9

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.8.8

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.8.7

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.8.6

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.8.5

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.8.4

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: quanru → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-21) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

v1.8.2

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.8.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.8.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.7.10

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.7.9

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.7.7

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.7.5

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.7.4

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.7.3

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.7.2

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.7.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.7.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.6.4

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.6.3

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.6.2

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.6.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.6.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.5.8

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-03-25) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.5.7

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-03-23) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.5.6

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-03-17) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.5.5

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-03-16) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.5.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-03-11) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.5.3

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-03-09) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.5.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-03-04) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.5.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-03-03) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.5.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-03-02) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.9

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-28) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.8

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-28) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.7

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-25) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.6

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-24) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.5

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-14) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-14) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.3

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.4.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.3.11

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-11) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.3.10

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-09) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.3.9

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-06) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.3.8

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: zhoushaw → quanru (on 2026-02-05) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.