@milaboratories/pl-error-like
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.12.10 | 2 / 7 | |
| 1.12.9 | 2 / 7 | |
| 1.12.8 | 2 / 7 | |
| 1.12.7 | 3 / 7 | |
| 1.12.6 | 3 / 7 | |
| 1.12.5 | 3 / 8 | |
| 1.12.4 | 3 / 8 | |
| 1.12.3 | 3 / 8 | |
| 1.12.2 | 3 / 7 |
v1.12.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.12.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.12.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.12.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.12.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.12.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.12.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.12.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.