@mirohq/design-system-box
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@mirohq/design-system-stitches | AI (dependencies): Internal Miro design-system scoped dep; consistent with monorepo pattern across all versions. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal design system component; sparse metadata is consistent across all versions of this package family. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Stable pattern for this Miro design system package; not a malware signal. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance across all 173 versions; consistent publishing pattern for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 35 of 35)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.2.29 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.28 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.27 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.26 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.25 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.24 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.23 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.22 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.21 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.20 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.19 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.18 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.17 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.16 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.15 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.14 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.13 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.12 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.11 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.10 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.9 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.8 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.7 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.2.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 0 |
v3.2.29
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.28
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.27
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.26
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.23
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.