@mirohq/design-system-switch
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): ivanbanov.miro is an established Miro-org publisher (869 approved); transition from mirohq-admin appears to be a legitimate internal handoff. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@mirohq/design-system-types | AI (dependencies): Internal Miro design system sibling dep; stable pattern across all versions of this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@mirohq/design-system-utils | AI (dependencies): Internal Miro design system sibling dep; stable pattern across all versions of this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@mirohq/design-system-stitches | AI (dependencies): Internal Miro design system sibling dep; stable pattern across all versions of this package. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Internal scoped package; missing description is consistent across the design system family. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Miro design system packages consistently lack provenance; not a risk signal for this publisher. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal Miro design system package; missing metadata is expected for scoped monorepo components. | ai |
Versions (showing 40 of 40)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.2.32 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.31 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.30 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.29 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.28 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.27 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.26 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.25 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.24 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.23 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.22 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.21 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.20 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.19 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.18 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.17 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.16 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.15 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.14 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.13 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.12 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.11 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.10 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.9 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.8 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.7 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.6 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.5 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.4 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.3 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.2.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.1.3 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.1.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.1.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.1.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.0.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.0.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 4.0.0 | 6 / 0 |
v4.2.32
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.31
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.30
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.29
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.28
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.26
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.23
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.