@mirohq/design-system-use-local-storage
3
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
No SLSA provenance
npm registry signatures
No source commit
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
ivanbanov.mirokaren.nmirohq-admin
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Miro publishes many packages without provenance; consistent across their portfolio. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal Miro monorepo package; missing metadata is a consistent pattern across the design-system suite, not a spam indicator. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Consistent with Miro design-system monorepo packaging style across all versions. | ai |
v1.1.1
1 finding
LOW
No provenance attestation
provenance
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
1 finding
INFO
No provenance attestation
provenance
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 finding
LOW
No provenance attestation
provenance
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.