@mjackson/headers
A toolkit for working with HTTP headers in JavaScript
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Trusted long-standing publisher (mjackson); missing gitHead reflects a publish environment change, not a security concern. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Informational only; many legitimate packages lack Sigstore provenance attestation. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.11.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.11.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.7.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.6.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.6.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.5.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.5.0 | 0 / 4 |
v0.11.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: mjackson.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: mjackson.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.0
1 findingThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
v0.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.