@mlightcad/libredwg-converter
The `libredwg-converter` package provides a DWG file converter for the RealDWG-Web ecosystem, enabling reading and conversion of DWG files into the AutoCAD-like drawing database structure. It is based on the [LibreDWG](https://www.gnu.org/software/libredw
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/libredwg-parser-worker.js | AI (source-diff): Web worker bundle; network/eval patterns are from bundled dependencies, not malicious dropper logic. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/libredwg-parser-worker.js | AI (source-diff): Minified/bundled Vite worker output for a CAD library; long lines are expected in this package's build artifacts. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Consistent across all 106 versions; publisher has not adopted Sigstore attestation, no other risk signals present. | ai |
Versions (showing 96 of 96)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.12.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.11.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.11.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.11.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.11.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.10.7 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.10.6 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.10.5 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.10.4 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.7.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.6.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.6.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.6.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.5.40 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.5.39 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.5.38 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.5.37 | 1 / 1 | |
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| 3.5.14 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.5.13 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.5.12 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.5.11 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.5.10 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.5.9 | 1 / 1 | |
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| 3.5.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.5.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.4.13 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.4.12 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.4.11 | 1 / 1 | |
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| 3.4.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.4.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.4.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.3.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.3.4 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.3.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.3.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.3.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.3.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.2.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.2.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.2.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.1.18 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.1.17 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.1.16 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.1.15 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.1.14 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.1.13 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.1.12 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.1.11 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.1.10 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.1.9 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.1.8 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.1.7 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.1.6 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.1.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.1.4 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.1.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.0.3 | 0 / 1 | |
| 3.0.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 3.0.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 3.0.0 | 0 / 1 |
v3.12.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.4
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (mlight.li) on 2026-07-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.5.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.