@mml-io/model-loader
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher is GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance; automated CI/CD publish is the intended pattern for this org. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer removal consistent with migration to GitHub Actions automated publishing; not a takeover signal here. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:build/index.js | AI (source-diff): Base64 content is three.js basis_transcoder.js bundled inline — a known legitimate pattern for this package's three.js dependency. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.26.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.26.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.25.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.24.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.24.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.23.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.23.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.22.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.21.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.21.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.21.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.21.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.20.0 | 1 / 1 |
v0.26.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.26.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 4 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.25.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 4 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.1
2 findingsModified file contains 4 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.24.0
2 findingsModified file contains 4 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.23.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.22.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.21.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.21.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.21.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.21.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.20.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.