@mongosh/arg-parser
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established MongoDB monorepo package; lack of Sigstore provenance is consistent across all versions and not a meaningful risk here. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.0.3 | 4 / 8 | |
| 5.0.2 | 4 / 8 | |
| 5.0.1 | 4 / 8 | |
| 5.0.0 | 4 / 8 | |
| 3.23.1 | 4 / 8 | |
| 3.23.0 | 4 / 9 | |
| 3.22.2 | 3 / 8 |
v5.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.23.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.23.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.22.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.