@mongosh/async-rewriter2
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.4.15 | 5 / 6 | |
| 2.4.14 | 5 / 6 | |
| 2.4.13 | 5 / 7 | |
| 2.4.12 | 5 / 7 | |
| 2.4.10 | 5 / 7 |
v2.4.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.