@mongosh/history
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): mcasimir_mdb appears to be a renamed/updated account for the same MongoDB contributor within the mongosh org. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): mcasimir removal paired with mcasimir_mdb addition indicates account rename, not a takeover. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Active mongosh monorepo package; dormancy signal is a false positive for this sub-package with 135 published versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.4.13 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.4.12 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.4.11 | 1 / 6 | |
| 2.4.9 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.4.8 | 2 / 7 |
v2.4.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.