@morphdsl/codec-json-impls
Morph codec-json-impls extension
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Package migrated to GitHub Actions publishing with SLSA attestation; CI publisher is expected and verifiable going forward. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@morphdsl/codec-dsl | AI (dependencies): Sibling package from same @morphdsl monorepo; expected internal dependency, consistent versioning across the org. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.9 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.1.8 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.1.7 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.1.6 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.1.5 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.1.4 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.1.3 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.1.2 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.1.1 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.1.0 | 3 / 5 |
v0.1.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.