@mpxjs/store
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
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Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.10.21 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.10.20 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.10.18 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.10.17 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.10.16 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.10.13 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.10.8 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.10.6 | 1 / 0 |
v2.10.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.10.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.10.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.10.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.10.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.10.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.10.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.10.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.