@msar/inbox
Analyze the message inbox data
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): battis→groton-it is a consistent org-level account transition; repo/author metadata all align with the same Groton School organization. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.8 | 4 / 6 | |
| 0.1.7 | 4 / 16 | |
| 0.1.6 | 4 / 16 | |
| 0.1.5 | 4 / 16 | |
| 0.1.4 | 4 / 16 | |
| 0.1.3 | 3 / 17 |
v0.1.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.