@multiformats/murmur3
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established multiformats org package with strong publisher track record; lack of provenance attestation is not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:murmurhash3js-revisited | AI (dependencies): murmurhash3js-revisited is a legitimate, long-standing dependency of this package used for murmur3 hashing in the IPFS/multiformats ecosystem. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.2.8 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.2.7 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.2.6 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.2.5 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.2.4 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.2.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.2.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.2.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.2.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.1.10 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2.1.9 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2.1.8 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2.1.7 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2.1.6 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2.1.5 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2.1.4 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2.1.3 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2.1.2 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2.1.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2.1.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 2.0.0 | 2 / 2 |
v2.2.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.