@mux/ai
AI library for Mux
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-CA7bG50u.d.ts | AI (source-diff): TypeScript declaration file with long type lines from AI SDK generics; not obfuscated code. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from individual maintainer to GitHub Actions CI publisher is consistent with Mux org automation; package metadata and repo URL unchanged. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-0a27mjs2.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Bundled .d.ts type declaration files routinely have long lines; sample shows readable JSDoc and type exports, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-BfsJvx3r.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Bundled .d.ts files routinely have long lines from complex generics; sample shows readable TypeScript types, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:p-retry | AI (phantom-deps): Conditional SDK loading pattern; stable for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:dotenv | AI (phantom-deps): Conditional SDK loading pattern; stable for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:openai | AI (phantom-deps): Conditional SDK loading pattern; stable for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@mux/mux-node | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped package; conditional loading pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@anthropic-ai/sdk | AI (phantom-deps): Conditional SDK loading pattern; stable for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@aws-sdk/client-s3 | AI (phantom-deps): Framework-scoped SDK; conditional loading pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@aws-sdk/lib-storage | AI (phantom-deps): Framework-scoped SDK; conditional loading pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@aws-sdk/s3-request-presigner | AI (phantom-deps): Framework-scoped SDK; conditional loading pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:zod | AI (phantom-deps): Conditional SDK loading pattern; stable for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-yn3fUDgv.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Generated .d.ts bundle from tsup; long lines are complex TypeScript generics, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:ajv | AI (typosquat): Scoped @mux/ai package from legitimate Mux org; not a typosquat of ajv. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:dotenv-expand | AI (phantom-deps): dotenv-expand is a listed runtime dependency; phantom-dep heuristic misfires here. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:qs | AI (typosquat): Scoped @mux/ai package from legitimate Mux org; not a typosquat of qs. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:hapi | AI (typosquat): Scoped @mux/ai package from legitimate Mux org; not a typosquat of hapi. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pg | AI (typosquat): Scoped @mux/ai package from legitimate Mux org; not a typosquat of pg. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): Scoped @mux/ai package from legitimate Mux org; not a typosquat of joi. | ai |
Versions (showing 35 of 35)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.22.0 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.20.0 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.19.0 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.18.0 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.17.1 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.17.0 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.16.1 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.15.1 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.14.0 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.13.1 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.13.0 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.12.1 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.10.0 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.9.0 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.8.2 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.8.1 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.8.0 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.7.6 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.7.5 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.7.4 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.7.3 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.7.2 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.6.0 | 14 / 16 | |
| 0.4.2 | 13 / 16 | |
| 0.4.0 | 13 / 15 | |
| 0.3.1 | 13 / 15 | |
| 0.3.0 | 13 / 15 | |
| 0.2.0 | 13 / 15 | |
| 0.1.6 | 12 / 14 | |
| 0.1.5 | 12 / 14 | |
| 0.1.4 | 12 / 14 | |
| 0.1.3 | 12 / 14 | |
| 0.1.2 | 9 / 7 | |
| 0.1.1 | 9 / 6 | |
| 0.1.0 | 9 / 6 |
v0.22.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.20.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.19.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.17.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.17.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.16.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.