@mux/mux-player
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/base.mjs | AI (source-diff): Minified build output from esbuilder; standard for this package's dist files. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Mux org package with SLSA provenance; dormancy reflects release cadence, not compromise. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:media-chrome | AI (dependencies): media-chrome is a well-known open-source media web component library; expected dependency for a video player package like @mux/mux-player. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:player.style | AI (dependencies): player.style is a CSS theming library used by Mux player; expected companion dependency with no meaningful risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@mux/mux-video | AI (dependencies): First-party Mux package from the same muxinc/elements monorepo; expected core dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@mux/playback-core | AI (dependencies): First-party Mux package from the same muxinc/elements monorepo; expected core dependency. | ai |
Versions (showing 36 of 36)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.13.2 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.13.0 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.12.0 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.11.8 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.11.7 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.11.6 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.11.5 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.11.4 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.10.2 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.10.1 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.10.0 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.9.2 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.9.1 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.9.0 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.8.0 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.7.0 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.6.1 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.6.0 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.5.3 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.5.2 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.5.1 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.5.0 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.4.1 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.4.0 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.3.4 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.3.3 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.3.2 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.3.1 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.3.0 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.2.4 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.2.3 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.2.2 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.2.1 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.2.0 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.1.0 | 4 / 18 | |
| 3.0.0 | 4 / 16 |
v3.13.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (mux-npmjs) on unknown date, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.3.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.