@mybricks/tarojs-taro-h5
Taro h5 framework
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance is common for this ecosystem; no other risk signals present. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.4 | 15 / 16 | |
| 0.0.3 | 15 / 16 | |
| 0.0.2 | 15 / 16 | |
| 0.0.1 | 15 / 16 |
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.