@myst-theme/common
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from bot to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing is consistent with org workflow migration; SLSA attestation confirms integrity. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): agoose77 added as maintainer in a well-established jupyter-book org package with SLSA provenance; consistent with legitimate org handoff. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:myst-common | AI (dependencies): Core myst-* ecosystem dependency; expected companion package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:myst-config | AI (dependencies): Core myst-* ecosystem dependency; expected companion package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:myst-spec-ext | AI (dependencies): Core myst-* ecosystem dependency; expected companion package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Legitimate scoped package in jupyter-book org; sparse README is a style choice, not a spam indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.1 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.3.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.2.2 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.2.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.1.4 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.1.3 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.1.2 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.1.1 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.1.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.0.1 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.18.0 | 5 / 0 |
v1.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.18.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.