@mysten/codegen
typescript codegen for sui move
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Mysten Labs monorepo uses 0.0.0 as a placeholder version across many packages; 103 versions in registry confirms established pattern. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): MystenLabs migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; not a takeover. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Team consolidation under automated CI publishing; consistent with org-wide migration. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Bulk removal consistent with migration to GitHub Actions publishing model. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@mysten/bcs | AI (phantom-deps): Same org scope; likely used transitively or by convention within the Mysten monorepo. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/node | AI (phantom-deps): Framework-scoped type package; loaded by convention in Node.js TypeScript projects. | ai |
Versions (showing 44 of 44)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.10.4 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.10.3 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.10.2 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.10.1 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.10.0 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.9.0 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.8.5 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.8.4 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.8.3 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.8.2 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.8.1 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.8.0 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.7.0 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.6.0 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.5.13 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.5.12 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.5.11 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.5.10 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.5.9 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.5.8 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.5.7 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.5.6 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.5.5 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.5.4 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.5.3 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.5.2 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.5.1 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.5.0 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.4.5 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.4.4 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.4.3 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.4.2 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.4.1 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.4.0 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.3.0 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.2.5 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.2.4 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.2.3 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.2.2 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.2.1 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.2.0 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.1.0 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.0.1 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.0.0 | 8 / 3 |
v0.10.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.