@mysten/ledgerjs-hw-app-sui
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from personal account (ebmifa) to GitHub Actions CI publishing is a supply chain improvement, not a takeover. SLSA provenance attestation confirms legitimate CI build. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/Sui.mjs | AI (source-diff): dist/Sui.mjs is a rolldown bundle that inlines previously-external @ledgerhq/* runtime deps. Network imports are from bundled transport libraries, not malicious code. SLSA attestation confirms build integrity. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase from 44KB to 940KB is explained by bundling 8 previously-external @ledgerhq/* runtime deps into the output via tsdown/rolldown migration. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy followed by legitimate org-owned CI publish with SLSA provenance. Mysten Labs is the established Sui blockchain team with 191 versions in registry. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:hex-decode | AI (semgrep): Hex decoding is used to convert Ledger trust service token descriptor data and signatures into binary buffers — standard cryptographic handling for a hardware wallet integration, not a malicious payload. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ledgerhq/ledger-trust-service | AI (phantom-deps): @ledgerhq/ledger-trust-service is a declared runtime dependency used in config/indirect references; not a security risk for this legitimate Ledger integration package. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.8.3 | 7 / 5 | |
| 0.8.2 | 7 / 5 | |
| 0.8.1 | 7 / 5 | |
| 0.8.0 | 7 / 5 | |
| 0.7.1 | 0 / 13 | |
| 0.7.0 | 8 / 8 | |
| 0.6.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.5.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.5.1 | 2 / 7 |
v0.8.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.