@mysten/signers
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): MystenLabs migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance; stable pattern for this org. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy explained by major version restructuring (0.x → 1.0); not indicative of account compromise. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer removal reflects org-level CI/CD transition, not a takeover; consistent with GitHub Actions publisher. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@noble/hashes | AI (phantom-deps): @noble/hashes is a legitimate cryptographic dependency declared in package.json; phantom detection is a packaging artifact, not a security concern for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@google-cloud/kms | AI (dependencies): Google Cloud KMS is a legitimate dependency for a cloud-backed cryptographic signers package in the @mysten ecosystem. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@mysten/ledgerjs-hw-app-sui | AI (dependencies): First-party Mysten Labs package for Ledger hardware wallet support; appropriate for a signers library. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:asn1-ts | AI (dependencies): ASN.1 encoding library is standard for cryptographic operations; expected in a signers package. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.5 | 4 / 2 | |
| 1.0.4 | 4 / 2 | |
| 1.0.2 | 5 / 5 | |
| 1.0.1 | 5 / 5 | |
| 1.0.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.6.2 | 6 / 5 | |
| 0.6.1 | 6 / 5 | |
| 0.6.0 | 6 / 5 | |
| 0.5.10 | 6 / 5 | |
| 0.5.9 | 6 / 5 | |
| 0.5.8 | 6 / 5 |
v1.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.