@mysten/slush-wallet
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): MystenLabs monorepo migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation; this is expected for the org. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy aligns with major version bump and tooling migration; consistent with legitimate org-level release cadence. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers are MystenLabs org members; consistent with team expansion on the official ts-sdks monorepo. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): chris-mysten removal alongside org-member additions looks like a routine team rotation, not a takeover. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Legitimate Mysten Labs SDK package; sparse README/keywords are common for internal/ecosystem packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@mysten/utils | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dependency; likely re-exported or used indirectly via transitive imports in the monorepo build. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.5 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.4 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.0.3 | 4 / 4 | |
| 1.0.2 | 4 / 4 | |
| 1.0.1 | 4 / 4 | |
| 1.0.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 0.3.0 | 6 / 4 | |
| 0.2.12 | 6 / 4 | |
| 0.2.11 | 6 / 4 | |
| 0.2.10 | 6 / 4 | |
| 0.1.0 | 6 / 4 |
v1.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.