@mysten/walrus
Walrus SDK
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): 65 new files reflect a major SDK refactor/expansion (v0.8.6→v1.0.2); consistent with legitimate version bump. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-dropped | AI (source-diff): Size drop explained by removal of bundled @mysten/sui (moved to peerDeps) and build tooling changes. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): MystenLabs migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; stable pattern for this org. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Consistent with org-level CI publishing transition; not indicative of takeover. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@mysten/walrus-wasm | AI (dependencies): First-party Mysten Labs WASM package; integral to this SDK across all versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.7 | 4 / 13 | |
| 1.1.6 | 4 / 13 | |
| 1.1.5 | 4 / 13 | |
| 1.1.4 | 4 / 17 | |
| 1.1.3 | 4 / 17 | |
| 1.1.2 | 4 / 17 | |
| 1.1.1 | 4 / 17 | |
| 1.1.0 | 4 / 17 | |
| 1.0.4 | 4 / 17 | |
| 1.0.3 | 4 / 17 | |
| 1.0.2 | 4 / 17 | |
| 1.0.1 | 4 / 17 | |
| 1.0.0 | 4 / 17 | |
| 0.9.0 | 5 / 17 | |
| 0.8.6 | 5 / 17 | |
| 0.8.5 | 5 / 17 | |
| 0.8.4 | 5 / 17 | |
| 0.8.3 | 5 / 17 |
v1.1.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.8.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.8.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.