@mysten/window-wallet-core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): MystenLabs migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; this is the expected pattern for their monorepo. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers are MystenLabs org members; consistent with team growth/reorganization. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removed maintainers reflect org restructuring, not a hostile takeover; SLSA provenance confirms legitimate CI publish. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy followed by CI-attested publish from official MystenLabs repo is not a takeover indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.6 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.1.5 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.1.4 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.1.3 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.1.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.1.1 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.1.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.6 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.5 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.4 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.3 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.2 | 3 / 3 |
v0.1.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.