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@mysten/zksend

npm Repository Homepage
11
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

ebmifahayespaul-mystenrushrs

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Moved to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance; stable for this org. ai
publish-pattern dormant-publish AI (publish-pattern): Major version bump after monorepo restructure; not indicative of takeover. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-added AI (maintainer-change): Mysten Labs team rotation; all new maintainers are org members. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-removed AI (maintainer-change): Mysten Labs team rotation; consistent with org restructure. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:mitt AI (phantom-deps): Declared runtime dep in a bundled SDK; phantom-dep heuristic fires on bundled/transitive usage. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:valibot AI (phantom-deps): Same — bundled SDK pattern, stable false positive. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:nanostores AI (phantom-deps): Same — bundled SDK pattern, stable false positive. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@mysten/utils AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive for this package. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@mysten/wallet-standard AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep; stable false positive. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@mysten/window-wallet-core AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep; stable false positive. ai

Versions (showing 11 of 11)

Version Deps Published
1.1.2 6 / 3
1.1.1 6 / 3
1.1.0 6 / 4
1.0.3 6 / 4
1.0.2 6 / 4
1.0.1 6 / 4
1.0.0 6 / 4
0.14.12 7 / 4
0.14.11 7 / 4
0.14.10 7 / 4
0.11.0 5 / 4

v1.1.2

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.1.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.1.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: ebmifa → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-17) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.0.3

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: ebmifa → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.0.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: ebmifa → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-10) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.0.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: ebmifa → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-30) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.0.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: ebmifa → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-29) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.14.12

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.14.11

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.14.10

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.11.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.