@n8n/design-system
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/compact-Q0gG5s1Q.js | AI (source-diff): File is a bundled emojibase-data JSON dataset; long lines are emoji unicode records, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): n8n migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing; maintainer list change is consistent with org-wide automation transition. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/compact-CWM3h4JV.js | AI (source-diff): File is a minified JSON blob of emoji unicode data — no obfuscation or malicious payload. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers are n8n org accounts; consistent with org-level team management. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): tomin8n is an n8n org account with 10 approved packages and SLSA provenance; publisher rotation is expected for this org. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/n8n-design-system.es.js | AI (source-diff): Encoded string is UMALQURA_DATA Islamic calendar lookup table, a known benign base64 blob from date library dependencies. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Established n8n org package with SLSA provenance; dormancy reflects release cadence, not account takeover. | ai |
Versions (showing 36 of 36)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.24.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.24.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.23.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.22.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.21.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.20.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.20.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.19.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.18.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.18.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.18.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.17.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.17.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.16.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.15.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.7.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.7.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.6.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.6.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.5.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.3.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.2.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.2.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.1.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.110.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.110.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.110.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.110.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.109.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.108.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.108.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.107.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.106.0 | 0 / 0 |
v2.24.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.24.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.23.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.22.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.21.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.20.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.20.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.19.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.18.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.18.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.17.1
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.17.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.16.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.15.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.7.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.0
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.1
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.0
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.0
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.0
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.0
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.1
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.0
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.1
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.0
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.0
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.110.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.110.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.110.1
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.110.0
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.109.0
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.108.1
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.108.0
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.107.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.106.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.