@n8n/scan-community-package
Static code analyser for n8n community packages
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Base64 decode is part of scanner's own payload parsing, matches package purpose. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:typescript | AI (phantom-deps): Used via config/tooling, not direct import; benign for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): n8n org migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation; this is the expected publisher going forward. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers are n8n org members; team rotation at an established org, not a takeover signal. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removals accompany additions as part of n8n org team rotation; no compromise indicators present. | ai |
Versions (showing 44 of 44)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.29.1 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.29.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.28.1 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.28.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.27.1 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.27.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.26.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.25.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.24.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.23.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.22.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.21.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.20.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.19.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.18.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 0.17.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.17.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.16.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.16.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.15.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.14.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.14.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.13.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.13.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.12.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.11.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.10.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.9.7 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.9.6 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.9.5 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.9.4 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.9.3 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.9.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.9.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.9.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.8.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.7.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.6.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.5.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.4.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.3.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 7 / 0 |
v0.29.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.29.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.28.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (n8n-matsuuu) on 2026-07-17, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.28.0
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. Multiple high-profile registry compromises have exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (n8n-matsuuu) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-07-16, but n8n-matsuuu is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.27.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.27.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.26.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.25.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.