@nan0web/markdown
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:api-obfuscation-reflect | AI (semgrep): Reflect.get() used in a Proxy trap handler — standard JS pattern, not obfuscation. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1.0 | 1 / 9 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.0.3 | 0 / 7 | |
| 1.0.2 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 4 |
v3.1.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: nan0web.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.