@nanoporetech-digital/components
A collection of Oxford Nanopore corporate / digital webcomponents
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:hydrate/index.js | AI (source-diff): Encoded string is a base64 Algolia API key with search filters for nanoporetech.com — legitimate search config, not a payload. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:hydrate/index.mjs | AI (source-diff): Same Algolia API key pattern in the ESM build; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@nanoporetech-digital/style | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org style package; declared as peer/dep for CSS delivery, not necessarily directly imported in JS. | ai |
v8.23.5
3 findingsModified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.23.4
3 findingsModified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.23.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.