@napi-rs/canvas-win32-arm64-msvc
Canvas for Node.js with skia backend
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from personal account to GitHub Actions CI/CD; SLSA provenance confirms legitimate automation. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is the standard napi-rs convention for platform-specific binary sub-packages; stable pattern for this publisher. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Native NAPI-RS addon; prebuilt .node binary is the expected artifact for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 17 of 17)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.100 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.99 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.98 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.97 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.96 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.95 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.94 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.93 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.92 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.91 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.90 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.89 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.88 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.87 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.86 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.85 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.1.100
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • skia.win32-arm64-msvc.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.99
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.98
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.97
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.96
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.95
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.94
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.93
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.92
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.91
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.90
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.89
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.88
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.87
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.86
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.85
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.