@necto/react
Necto's React package aggregating all React utilities and components.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; provenance improved. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): CI-published with SLSA attestation; gitHead gap alone isn't malicious behavior. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): Same-org sibling package in a monorepo aggregator, not an unvetted third party dep. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Empty description is a consistent pattern for this package across versions; not indicative of malice. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@necto-react/popper | AI (phantom-deps): Declared dep used in config/re-export pattern; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive here. | ai |
Versions (showing 38 of 38)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.0 | 1 / 13 | |
| 1.3.6 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.3.5 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.3.4 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.3.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.3.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.3.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.3.0 | 1 / 12 | |
| 1.2.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.2.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.2.0 | 1 / 12 | |
| 1.1.37 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.1.36 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.1.35 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.1.34 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.1.33 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.1.32 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.1.31 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.1.30 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.1.29 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.1.28 | 5 / 0 | |
| 1.1.27 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.1.26 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.1.25 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.1.22 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.1.21 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.1.20 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.1.19 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.1.18 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.1.17 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.1.16 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.1.15 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.1.14 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.1.13 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.1.12 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.1.11 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.1.1 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 9 |
v1.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.6
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.37
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.36
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.35
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.34
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.33
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.32
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.31
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.30
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.29
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.28
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.22
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: botond-szabo.
v1.1.21
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: botond-szabo.
v1.1.20
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: botond-szabo.
v1.1.19
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: botond-szabo.
v1.1.18
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: botond-szabo.
v1.1.16
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: botond-szabo.
v1.1.14
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: botond-szabo.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.