@neo4j/graphql
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation confirms CI/CD integrity for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/translate/utils/apoc-wrapper.js | AI (source-diff): File is a standard Cypher query builder wrapper with Neo4j Apache-2.0 license header; no actual network calls or dynamic code execution. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy gap explained by major version development cycle; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate CI/CD publish. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): neo4j/graphql migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance; this is the expected publisher going forward. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): Major version bump (3.x→7.x) naturally adds hundreds of source files; no obfuscation indicators. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Large version gap (v3→v7); org-level team rotation expected for a long-lived Neo4j package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): All 5 new deps are established, well-known packages appropriate for a GraphQL/Neo4j library. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@as-integrations/express4 | AI (phantom-deps): Declared runtime dep used indirectly via Apollo Server integration; not a phantom dep concern. | ai |
Versions (showing 30 of 30)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.5.3 | 17 / 32 | |
| 7.5.2 | 18 / 31 | |
| 7.5.1 | 18 / 31 | |
| 7.5.0 | 18 / 31 | |
| 7.4.4 | 18 / 31 | |
| 7.4.3 | 18 / 31 | |
| 7.4.2 | 18 / 31 | |
| 7.4.1 | 18 / 31 | |
| 7.4.0 | 18 / 31 | |
| 7.3.3 | 18 / 31 | |
| 7.3.2 | 18 / 32 | |
| 7.3.1 | 18 / 32 | |
| 7.3.0 | 18 / 32 | |
| 7.2.13 | 18 / 32 | |
| 7.2.12 | 18 / 32 | |
| 7.2.11 | 18 / 32 | |
| 7.2.10 | 18 / 32 | |
| 7.2.9 | 17 / 32 | |
| 7.2.8 | 17 / 32 | |
| 7.2.7 | 17 / 32 | |
| 7.2.6 | 17 / 32 | |
| 7.2.5 | 17 / 32 | |
| 7.2.4 | 17 / 32 | |
| 7.2.3 | 17 / 32 | |
| 7.2.2 | 17 / 32 | |
| 7.2.1 | 17 / 32 | |
| 7.2.0 | 17 / 32 | |
| 7.1.3 | 17 / 32 | |
| 7.1.2 | 17 / 32 | |
| 3.9.0 | 13 / 35 |
v7.5.3
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.5.2
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.5.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.4.4
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.4.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.4.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.2.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.9.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.