@neovici/cosmoz-bottom-bar
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): Package consistently published via Neovici CI/CD with Sigstore attestation; stable pattern going forward. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher is consistent with SLSA-attested CI/CD automation; not an account compromise. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy explained by CI/CD migration; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate publish from official repo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@neovici/cosmoz-utils | AI (dependencies): First-party Neovici org dependency; stable pattern across all versions of this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@pionjs/pion | AI (dependencies): Known web-components ecosystem dependency used consistently by Neovici packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@neovici/cosmoz-collapse | AI (dependencies): First-party Neovici org dependency; stable pattern across all versions of this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@neovici/cosmoz-dropdown | AI (dependencies): First-party Neovici org dependency; stable pattern across all versions of this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 11.1.1 | 6 / 22 | |
| 11.0.1 | 6 / 24 | |
| 11.0.0 | 6 / 24 | |
| 10.2.4 | 6 / 24 | |
| 10.2.3 | 6 / 24 | |
| 10.2.2 | 6 / 24 | |
| 10.2.1 | 6 / 24 | |
| 10.2.0 | 6 / 24 | |
| 10.1.0 | 6 / 24 | |
| 10.0.0 | 6 / 23 | |
| 9.5.0 | 6 / 22 | |
| 9.4.0 | 6 / 22 |
v11.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.2.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.2.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.2.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.