@neuraiproject/neurai-rpc
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:shady-links-raw-ip | AI (semgrep): All 178 hits are in docs.ts example snippets showing curl RPC calls; not runtime network code. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.4.7 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.4.6 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.4.5 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.4.3 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.4.2 | 0 / 7 |
v0.4.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.