@newrelic/security-agent
New Relic Security Agent for Node.js
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance via Sigstore/CI is a strong integrity signal for this New Relic org package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Decoding fuzz request headers in gRPC hook; expected for IAST agent functionality. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:eval-usage | AI (semgrep): Eval used for generator function feature detection, not arbitrary input execution. Stable pattern for this security agent. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): Security instrumentation agent legitimately imports child_process to monitor system calls; expected for IAST/RASP tooling. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require resolves own package.json for version info using a known config constant; not user-controlled input. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0.4 | 17 / 30 | |
| 3.0.3 | 18 / 30 | |
| 3.0.2 | 18 / 30 | |
| 3.0.1 | 22 / 30 | |
| 3.0.0 | 22 / 30 | |
| 0.2.0 | 22 / 30 |
v3.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.