@newtype-os/cli-darwin-arm64
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific binary distribution package; no JS code, deps, or description is expected for this pattern. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Binary distribution sub-package; description omission is consistent with this packaging pattern. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.76 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.75 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.74 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.73 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.72 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.67 | 0 / 0 |
v0.0.76
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.75
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.74
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.73
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.72
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.67
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.