@next/env
Next.js dotenv file loading
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publishing; SLSA provenance present, gitHead absence is cosmetic. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Vercel org consolidating to GH Actions publishing; maintainers still control the repo. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from vercel-release-bot to GitHub Actions CI; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate pipeline change. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): @next/env uses 0.0.0 as a legitimate namespace-reservation stub; this is a documented pattern for Next.js scoped packages with 2809 real versions in the registry. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:ajv | AI (typosquat): @next/env is an official Vercel/Next.js scoped package; Levenshtein match to 'ajv' is purely coincidental with no brand impersonation. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Inflated semver and minimal README are expected for Next.js sub-packages versioned in lockstep with the framework. Publisher is vercel-release-bot with strong track record. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 268)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 16.2.10 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.2.9 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.2.8 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.2.7 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.2.6 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.2.5 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.2.4 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.2.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.2.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.2.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.2.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.1.7 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.1.6 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.1.5 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.1.4 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.1.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.1.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.1.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.1.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.0.11 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.0.10 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.0.9 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.0.8 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.0.7 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.0.6 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.0.5 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.0.4 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.0.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.0.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.0.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.0.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.20 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.19 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.18 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.16 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.15 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.14 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.13 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.12 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.11 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.10 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.9 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.8 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.7 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.6 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.5 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.4 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 15.5.0 | 0 / 3 |
v16.2.10
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.2.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.2.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.2.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.2.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.5.20
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v15.5.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v15.5.18
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.