@next/swc-linux-arm64-gnu
This is the **linux-arm64-gnu** binary for `@next/swc`
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Vercel migrated publishing from vercel-release-bot to GitHub Actions CI; SLSA attestation confirms trusted build provenance. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific native binary stub; no deps/keywords/README code is expected for @next/swc-* packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 16.2.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 16.2.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 16.2.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 16.2.4 | 0 / 0 |
v16.2.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.2.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.2.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v16.2.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.