@nextrush/core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped @nextrush/core is a framework package, not a typosquat of cors; name similarity is coincidental. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0.6 | 2 / 4 | |
| 3.0.5 | 2 / 4 | |
| 3.0.3 | 2 / 4 | |
| 3.0.1 | 2 / 4 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 4 |
v3.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.5
2 findingsPackage name '@nextrush/core' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'cors'.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.