@ng-icons/iconsax
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 33.4.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.3.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.2.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.2.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.2.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.2.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.0.1 | 1 / 0 |
v33.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v33.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v33.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v33.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v33.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v33.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v33.0.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (ashley-hunter) on 2026-04-11, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.